

Message Text

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ACTION EA-12

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PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-12 NRC-05

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INFO CINCPAC

COMUSKOREA

DOD WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 8951

STATE FOR EA/K, CU/EA

CINCPAC FOR USIA ADVISOR AND POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, KS

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROJECT

REF: (A) SEOUL 6545 (C) R 050153Z AUG 77, (B) SEOUL 6788-C

R 120857 AUG 77, (C) USIA 23872-C (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: MISSION PROPOSES A LONG-TERM PROJECT ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TO SUPPLEMENT THE USIS KOREA FIVE-YEAR PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN. IT WILL BE INCORPORATED IN FY-78 USIS COUNTRY PLAN AS PROJECT KS-16. END SUMMARY.

1. AS THE U.S. GROUND TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA PROCEEDS, WE ANTICIPATE CONTINUED CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE KOREAN PUBLIC FOR THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC. AS EMBASSY HAS REPORTED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, THIS CONCERN HAS ALREADY
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MANIFESTED ITSELF IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS. ONE SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF THIS CONCERN IS A CONTINUING DIALOGUE AND HEIGHTENED INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF ROK ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS A MEANS OF BOLSTERING ROK SELF-RELIANCE. THESE VIEWS ARE AT THE MOMENT BEING DISCUSSED MAINLY WITHIN A CIRCLE OF INTELLECTUALS AS WELL AS EX-MILITARY, BUT THEIR DIALOGUE OCCASIONALLY IS ALSO TOLD IN

THE PRESS. MUCH OF THIS DIALOGUE IS UNINFORMED AND UNREALISTIC, BUT YET ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY CURRENT AND LIKELY TO SPREAD TO A WIDER KOREAN CIRCLE TO JUSTIFY SOME PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION ON OUR PART COUNTERING KOREAN ILLUSIONS AND ASSURING THAT THE DISCUSSIONS ARE INFORMED AND INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS. FINALLY, WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL THAT THESE UNREALISTIC VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE FOUND IN SOME GOVERNMENT CIRCLES, WHO COULD BE INFLUENCED BY OUR EFFORTS.

2. TO DEAL WITH THE SEVERAL DIMENSIONS OF THIS PROBLEM, WE FORESEE THE NEED TO INVOLVE INFLUENTIAL KOREAN AUDIENCES IN DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING THEMES:

A. THE U.S. COMMITMENT AND ITS CREDIBILITY - FOR OUR APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION, PLEASE SEE REFTELS.

B. U.S. POLICY ON NON-PROLIFERATION - ALTHOUGH THE KOREAN PRESS HAS CARRIED A NUMBER OF STORIES ON THIS ISSUE, FURTHER INFORMATION PROGRAMS WOULD SEEM TO BE IN ORDER.

C. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS - AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR ARMAMENT WOULD INCUR UNACCEPTABLE POLITICAL COSTS WHICH WOULD FAR OUTWEIGH ANY BENEFITS. IT WOULD ERODE ESSENTIAL INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND HARM OTHER CONFIDENTIAL

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KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY GOALS, PARTICULARLY IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF KOREAN DESIRE TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY WILL INCUR SERIOUS NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. INTERNATIONAL SPECULATION ABOUT KOREAN INTENT WOULD HAVE DAMAGING RESULTS, ISOLATING KOREA. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE IN KOREA'S INTEREST TO CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO A POLICY OF NON-PROLIFERATION.

IN STRATEGIC TERMS, KOREA'S GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO THE EFFECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GIVEN THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE RELATIVE STATE OF HARDENING OF INSTALLATIONS IN THE NORTH AS OPPOSED TO THE SOUTH, THE HIGH POSSIBILITY THAT A NUCLEAR EFFORT IN THE SOUTH WOULD EVOKE A SIMILAR EFFORT IN THE NORTH, AND THE PREDICTABLE RESPONSE OF THE PRC AND USSR TO THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR ARMS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE ROK, IT IS CLEAR THAT EXERCISE OF A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR OPTION WOULD HAVE A NET NEGATIVE RESULT.

ANY HINT THAT SOUTH KOREA HAS AN AMBITION FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD STIMULATE AN UNCONTROLLABLE ARMS RACE BY ADVERSARIES AND GREATLY INCREASE THE RISKS OF AN

UNSTABLE MILITARY BALANCE FOR A SMALL NATION. IT COULD HAVE PROFOUND EFFECTS ON JAPAN. IT WOULD DANGEROUSLY ESCALATE THE RISKS OF PRECIPITOUS ACTION BY NORTH KOREA WITH SOVIET AND PRC SUPPORT AND WOULD BE A REVERSAL OF THE GOALS KOREA AND THE U.S. HAVE SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

D. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A DETERRENT - WE NEED TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE AVAILABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A DETERRENT TO THE SUPER POWERS FROM THE AVAILABILITY OF SUCH WEAPONS TO POTENTIAL NEWCOMERS TO THE NUCLEAR GROUP. SOME KOREANS TEND TO BELIEVE THAT, "WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE GOOSE, IS GOOD FOR THE GANDER". THAT ARGUMENT HAS TO BE EXAMINED AND DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN "GOOSE" AND CONFIDENTIAL

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"GANDER" SHARPLY DRAWN. FURTHERMORE, THE FACT THAT WE HAVE EXTENDED THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA TO COVER KOREA REQUIRES WIDER DISSEMINATION. FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS USE ON APPROPRIATE ENEMY TARGETS, THE LOCATION OF THE WEAPONS IS NOT A PRIME CONSIDERATION. IN TODAY'S WORLD THEY CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR FROM NEAR AND FAR AND THEIR LOCATION IS NOT IMPORTANT FOR EITHER DIRECT MILITARY OR DETERRENCE PURPOSES. WE SHOULD NOT HOWEVER DEVIATE FROM OUR NON-DISCLOSURE POLICY ON LOCATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

E. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS TACTICAL WEAPONS - THE NARROWNESS OF THE PENINSULA CREATES SOME UNIQUE PROBLEMS FOR USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT SHOULD BE FURTHER EMPHASIZED THAT SHOULD THE NORTH OBTAIN TACTICAL WEAPONS OF A SIMILAR NATURE IN RESPONSE THE PRINCIPAL POPULATION CENTER OF THE SOUTH, THE SEOUL AREA, WOULD BECOME VULNERABLE TO ATTACK BY SUCH WEAPONS. THE SOUTH, BY CONTRAST, WOULD GAIN NO COMPARABLE ADVANTAGE FROM HOLDING TACTICAL WEAPONS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 8951

STATE FOR EA/K, CU/EA

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F. RELATIONSHIP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO NUCLEAR FUEL
SUPPLY - TWO DECADES AFTER ENTERING INTO ATOMIC ENERGY
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S., KOREA IS ABOUT TO BENEFIT FROM
LOW-COST ELECTRIC ENERGY, WHICH WILL BE GENERATED COM-
MERCIALY AT KORI NUCLEAR POWER STATION EARLY IN 1978.
THIS IS THE FIRST OF 21 NUCLEAR PLANTS PLANNED FOR
OPERATION IN KOREA BY THE YEAR 2000--AMOUNTING TO CREATION
OF A KOREAN NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY IN LESS THAN 25 YEARS.
THIS FORMIDABLE TASK CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ONLY WITH ACTIVE
SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR FUEL AND EQUIPMENT-EXPORTING NATIONS
WHOSE SELF-INTEREST IN NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND IN MAINTAINING ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS HAS
INTENSIFIED APPRECIABLY AS A RESULT OF U.S. INITIATIVES.
TO MERIT SUCH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, KOREA MUST MAINTAIN
HIGH STANDARDS OF ADHERENCE TO NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES
WHICH THE U.S. HAS PROMOTED.
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SUPPLIER-COUNTRY CONFIDENCE IN KOREAN COMMITMENT TO
COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS IS THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL INITIA-
TION AND COMPLETION OF KOREA'S AMBITIOUS NUCLEAR ENERGY
PROGRAM. ADDITIONAL COSTS AND THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN
INSPECTORS INVOLVED IN ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AND
BILATERAL SAFEGUARD AGREEMENTS ARE TO BE CONSIDERED
NECESSARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROTECT KOREAN INVESTMENT IN
PRESENT GENRATION NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS WHILE MINIMIZING
IF NOT ELIMINATING PRLIERATION PTENTIAL.

THE U.S. REMAINS A RELIABLE AND RESPONSIBLE SOURCE
OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIES, AND IS CONSIDERING THE ESTABLISHMENT
WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL ENTITY OF AN "ENRICHED URANIUM

FUEL BANK" WHICH WOULD ASSURE AVAILABILITY OF POWER REACTOR FUEL TO NATIONS WHICH HAVE GIVEN BINDING NON-PROLIFERATION ASSURANCES AND HAVE ACCEPTED ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS.

G. ECONOMIC COSTS - THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE MASSIVE AND WOULD DRAIN RESOURCES NEEDED FOR CONTINUED BUILDING OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STRENGTH. SUCH A POLICY WOULD DISTORT NATIONAL PRIORITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL IN RECENT YEARS.

3. PROJECT AUDIENCE WOULD BE:

A. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.

B. TECHNICAL EXPERTS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY FIELD.

C. MILITARY.
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D. INFORMED KOREANS WHOSE OPINION INFLUENCES THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS.

4. PROPOSED PROJECT ACTIVITIES

A. A CONTRACT WITH AN AMERICAN ORGANIZATION TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE OF NON-PROLIFERATION IN KOREA AND THE COSTS OF PROLIFERATION IN GREATER DETAIL. INCLUDED IN THIS CONTRACT SHOULD BE PROVISION FOR THE CONDUCT OF A NUMBER OF JOINT US-ROK SEMINARS, DESIGNED TO AMPLIFY FOR THE ROK AUDIENCE THE THEREMES OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH TWO, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR STRATEGIES AND ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR THE KOREAN AREA. THESE SEMINARS WOULD BE HELD IN KOREA WITH INVITATION FOR PARTICIPATION BEING EXTENDED TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AUDIENCE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH THREE. IN ADDITION, THE PAPERS AND MINUTES OF THE SEMINARS MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN PAMPHLETS WHICH CAN BE DISSEMINATED TO INFLUENTIAL ROK PERSONALITIES.

B. TWO INTERNATIONAL VISITOR IV PROGRAM GRANTS IN FY-78 TO (1) A KOREAN TECHNICAL EXPERT WHO CAN OBSERVE IN THE U.S. THE NEED FOR AND TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF NON-PROLIFERATION STANDARDS, AND WHO IN TURN CAN ACT AS A SPOKESMAN FOR THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IN ADVOCATING CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO THESE STANDARDS, AND (2) AN INFLUENTIAL AND THOUGHTFUL JOURNALIST WHO, AFTER EXPOSURE TO THE ISSUE IN THE U.S., CAN WRITE ARTICLES WHICH REACH

AUDIENCE MEMBERS SUPPORTING THE PROJECT'S THEMES. NOTE:
WE ARE NOMINATING FOR FIRST SLOT DR. KEUNG SHIK PARK,
KOREA'S FIRST DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION DIRECTORATE, WHICH WAS SET
UP IN COMPLIANCE WITH NPT REQUIREMENTS.

C. A SERIES OF LECTURE DISCUSSIONS IN LATE 1977
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AND EARLY 1978 ON "ENERGY ALTERNATIVES", TO FEATURE DIS-
CREET COVERAGE ON THE PROJECT'S THEMES IN PORTIONS OF THE
PROGRAM WHICH DEAL WITH NUCLEAR ENERGY. OTHER PORTIONS
WOULD EXPLICATE PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENERGY PROGRAM AND
INTERNATIONAL MEASURES FOR ENERGY COOPERATION. ARRANGE-
MENTS WOULD BE MADE FOR SPEAKERS IN PROGRAM TO MEET
INFORMALLY WITH KOREAN DECISION-MAKERS FOR ONE-TO-ONE
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES. SPEAKERS SELECTED, PRIMARILY FROM
THE PRIVATE SECTOR, WOULD HAVE TO BE TOP-LEVEL IN THEIR
FIELD. DEFENSE/STRATEGIC INSTITUTES WOULD BE INCLUDED
IN PROGRAMS.

D. A SERIES OF ARTICLES BY PRESTIGIOUS EXPERTS,
COMMISSIONED OR ACQUIRED BY USIA, WOULD BE PLACED IN
KOREAN INTELLECTUAL AND STRATEGIC JOURNALS.

E. A SERIES OF VIDEO TAPES, SUCH AS THE INTERVIEW,
"U.S. POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION", WITH
DR. LAWRENCE SHEINMAN, SENIOR ASSISTANT ON NUCLEAR
AFFAIRS TO UNDER SECRETARY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WHICH USIS HAS RECENTLY TRANSLATED
INTO KOREAN, WOULD BE SHOWN AT APPROPRIATE SEMINARS AND
OTHER OCCASIONS.

F. USIS LIBRARY WOULD DEVELOP AN IN-DEPT SPECIALIZED
COLLECTION ON NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND
MAKE IT, WITH OUR REFERENCE SERVICE, AVAILABLE TO KOREAN
EXPERTS AND WRITERS.

G. HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS WHO ARE EXPERTS IN FIELD
AND SPEAKERS AT PROPOSED UIS-SPONSORED LECTURE DISCUS-
SIONS OF PROJECT THEMES. EXPLORATION WILL BE MADE OF
FEASIBILITY OF INVITING U.S. MILITARY EXPERTS FOR SIMILAR
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DISCUSSIONS.

5. IN ALL ACTIVITIES, MISSION ELEMENTS WILL ADOPT
DISCREET, CAREFULLY TARGETED APPROACH TO TOPIC, BEARING
IN MIND THAT AN OVERLY DIRECT, CONFRONTATIONAL POSITION
WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. FURTHERMORE, OUR PROGRAMS
WILL HAVE TO PROCEED ON A MEASURED PACE TO INSUR THAT
OVER-DRAMATIZATION OF OUR CONCERNS DOES NOT BECOME COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE.

6. THIS PROPOSAL HAS CONCURRENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR AND
COMUSKOREA.
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Message Attributes

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